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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is the evaluation of various profit drivers such as price
changes, productivity changes and quality levels on the financial performance of the
Water and Sewerage Companies (WaSCs) over time in the case when the number of
observations is limited. We thereby follow Maziotis, Saal and Thanassoulis (2012)
approach and extend it by measuring the impact of exogenous factors such as drinking
water and sewerage treatment quality on profitability, productivity and price
performance measures. The results suggest that while quality improvements have
significantly contributed to the productivity performance of the WaSCs, they have
also contributed negatively to their price performance. Overall, after 2000 steady
reduction in average price performance, gains in productivity and stable economic
profitability were apparent. This trend indicates Ofwat’s policy on passing
productivity benefits to consumers, and sustaining stable profitability than it was in
earlier regulatory periods. This technique is of great interest for both regulators and
regulated companies to better identify the sources of profit variation and aid them in
evaluating both the effectiveness of a regulatory price cap scheme and the
performance of the regulated companies, when the sample size is extremely limited.

Keywords: Profit Decomposition, Productivity, Price Performance, Quality Change,
Panel Index Numbers, Regulation, Water and Sewerage Industry
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1. Introduction1
The water and sewerage industry in England and Wales was privatized in 1989
and before privatization there were 10 Regional Water Authorities responsible for the
water and sewerage supply in England and Wales and 29 Statutory Water companies,
which were already privatized companies that were only responsible for the supply of
water. After 1989, the 10 Regional Water Authorities were privatized and formed the
Water and Sewerage Companies (WaSCs) and the 29 Statutory Water Companies
became Water Only Companies (WoCs). Today there are 10 WaSCs whose duties
include the supply of water in areas that are not supplied by the WoCs, and the
collection, treatment and disposal of sewerage in all areas. However, there are now
only 11 WoCs, after mergers and takeovers. The WaSCs supply drinking water to
80% of the population in England and Wales with WoCs supplying the rest. There are
three regulatory bodies in the water and sewerage industry. The Office of Water
Services (Ofwat), which is the economic regulator and sets the price limits for each
company every five years, the Environment Agency (EA), which is responsible for
pollution control, licensing and regulation of water abstraction, and the Drinking
Water Inspectorate (DWI), which is responsible for controlling and monitoring
drinking water quality.
There were plenty of studies in the past that used Stochastic Frontier Analysis
(SFA) or Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) techniques to measure the productivity
performance of the UK water and sewerage industry before and after privatization and
evaluate the impact of the regulatory price cap scheme on their financial performance
(see Maziotis (2012) for a comprehensive literature review). However, few studies
exist that use index number techniques to measure the overall performance (profits,
productivity and price performance) of the UK water and sewerage sector. The
importance of index numbers lies on the fact that they allow the measurement of the
performance of companies when the number of observations is extremely limited. A
significant advantage compared to other estimation techniques such as SFA and DEA
which require a relatively large number of observations to specify an efficient frontier

1
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The first profit decomposition analysis using index numbers to assess
performance measurement in the UK water and sewerage industry was developed by
Saal and Parker (2001), originally introduced by Waters & Tretheway (1999) for the
Australian telecommunication industry. Saal and Parker (2001) employed a temporal
(over time) Tornqvist index approach to measure the impact of privatization and
regulation on productivity (TFP), price performance (TPP) and profitability for
WaSCs for the years 1985-2000. The authors concluded that indicated that
privatization did not lead to a significant improvement in the overall productivity
growth of WaSCs, whereas the tightened 1994/95 price review reduced firm-specific
economic profitability but there were not any significant improvements in
productivity. Moreover, Saal and Parker’s (2001) approach was then developed by
Maziotis, Saal and Thanassoulis (2009) and (2012). The former used a cross sectional
(spatial) index number technique to allow for the cross-sectional (spatial)
measurement of TFP, regulatory price performance (TPP), and profitability and
showed the subsequent comparison of how these cross sectional measures have
changed over time. Changes in TFP, TPP and profitability were measured after taking
into account the impact of exogenous characteristics such as drinking water and
sewerage treatment quality. Maziotis, Saal and Thanassoulis (2012) developed a panel
index approach across WaSCs over time to decompose unit-specific (temporal) index
number based profitability growth as a function of the profitability, productivity and
price performance growth achieved by benchmark firms, and the catch-up to the
benchmark firm achieved by less productive firms. However, the authors did not take
into account the impact of quality in the productivity and price performance measures.
Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to follow Maziotis, Saal and
Thanassoulis (2012) approach and extend it by measuring the impact of exogenous
factors on profitability, productivity and price performance measures. As adjustments
for quality affect the productivity and price performance measures leaving the
measured economic profitability unchanged, the unit-specific profitability growth can
be expressed as a function of the unit-specific quality adjusted productivity and
quality-adjusted price performance change. This can be further decomposed as a
function of the quality adjusted catch-up in productivity, and the quality adjusted
productivity growth of the benchmark firm, and the quality adjusted catch-up in price
performance, and the quality adjusted price performance growth of the benchmark
firm. The inclusion of quality in our analysis allows us to finally decompose unit3
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specific economic profitability change as a function of the quality unadjusted catch-up
in productivity, the catch-up in quality regarding productivity, and the qualityunadjusted productivity and quality performance over time of the benchmark firm,
and the quality unadjusted catch-up in price performance, the catch-up in quality
regarding price performance, and the price performance and quality growth of the
benchmark firm. We illustrate our analytical decomposition of profit change with an
empirical application to the regulated English and Welsh water and sewerage industry
during the period 1991-2008.
This paper unfolds as follows. Sections 2 and 3, consider the methodology
necessary to apply this approach in a bilateral and multilateral context. The following
section provides a discussion of data employed and the next section details the
empirical results. Section 6 eventually concludes.
2. Methodology
2.1. Unit specific Profitability, Productivity and Price Performance Indices
Following the approach of Waters & Tretheway (1999), Saal & Parker (2001)
and Maziotis, Saal and Thanassoulis (2012) we first measure profits, productivity and
price performance between two time periods, year t and the base year 1 for firm i .
Economic profits of firm i at the base year 1, Π i ,1 , are defined as a ratio of total
revenues, Ri ,1 and total costs in year 1, Ci ,1 . Total revenues of a firm i at period
1 , Ri ,1 , are defined as Ri ,1 = Pi ,1 × Yi ,1 , where Pi ,1 and Yi ,1 respectively represent the

output price index and the aggregate output index at period 1. Similarly,
C i ,1 = Wi ,1 × X i ,1 .We can thus define and decompose a unit-specific (temporal) index

of economic profitability for firm i at period t relative to the base period 1, π i,USt , as
follows:
Ri,t

π iUS
,t =

Π i ,t
Πi,1

=

Pi,t Yi,t

Yi,t

Pi,t

Ci,t Wi,t X i,t TFPi,t TPPi,t Yi,1 Pi,1 YiUS
PiUS
,t
,t
US
=
=
×
=
×
= US × US = TFPiUS
,t ×TPP
i ,t
Ri,1
Pi,1Yi,1 TFPi,1 TPPi,1 X i,t Wi,t X i,t Wi,t
Ci,1 Wi,1 X i,1
X i,1 Wi,1

(1)

Thus, the unit-specific economic profitability index, π i,USt can be expressed as a
function of an index of unit-specific total factor productivity in period t relative to the
4
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base year 1, TFPiUS
and an index of unit-specific total price performance between
,t
US
US
US
period t and 1, TPPiUS
X iUS
and TPPiUS
WiUS
these indices
,t . As TFPi ,t = Yi ,t
,t
,t = Pi ,t
,t

can be further decomposed as functions of the unit-specific output ( YiUS
,t = Yi ,t Yi ,1 ),
input

( X iUS
,t = X i ,t X i ,1 ),

output

price

( PiUS
,t = Pi ,t Pi ,1 )

and

input

price

( WiUS
,t = Wi ,t Wi ,1 ) indices. This decomposition highlights that observed changes in
unit-specific profitability over time can be explained by changes in productivity,
changes in price performance, or changes in both.
2.2. Spatial Profitability, Productivity, and Price Performance Indices
We next consider the relationship between profits, productivity and price
performance for firm i relative to a base firm b at time t, which we call a spatial index,
thereby adopting the terminology employed in the price index literature (Hill, 2004).
As a result of its definition, these indices only directly measure differences in
performance in the spatial dimension (between firms) at any given time. Economic
profits of the base firm b at time t, Π b,t , are defined as a ratio of its total revenues,
Rb ,t and total costs, C b ,t , at time t. Thus, the total revenues of the base firm b at

period t are defined as Rb ,t = Pb ,t × Yb ,t , where Pb ,t and Yb ,t present the output price
index and the aggregate output index respectively of the base firm b at period t. Its
total costs at year t, C b ,t , are defined as C b ,t = Wb ,t × X b ,t , where Wb ,t and X b ,t
denotes the input price index and the aggregate input index respectively of the base
firm at year t. Similarly, we can define economic profits of any firm i at period t , Π i,t
as a ratio of its total revenues, Ri ,t and its total costs, C i ,t . We can thus define and
decompose a spatial economic profitability index for any firm i relative to the base
firm b at period t, π b,S t as follows:
Ri,t

π =
S
i ,t

Π i ,t
Πb,t

Pi,t Yi,t

Yi,t

Pi,t

Ci,t Wi,t X i,t TFPi,t TPPi,t Yb,t Pb,t
Yi,St Pi,St
=
=
=
×
=
×
= S × S = TFPi,St ×TPPi,St (2)
Rb,t
Pb,t Yb,t
TFPb,t TPPb,t X i,t Wi,t X i,t Wi,t
Cb,t Wb,t X b,t
X b,t Wb,t
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Thus, at time t, a spatial economic profitability index, π i,St can be expressed as a
function of an index of spatial total factor productivity for firm i relative to the base
firm b, TFPi ,St and a spatial index of total price performance between firm i and the
base firm b, TPPi ,St . As TFPi ,St = Yi ,St X iS, t and TPPi ,St = Pi ,St Wi ,St these indices can be
further decomposed as functions of the spatial output ( Yi ,St = Yi ,t Yb,t ), input
( X iS,t = X i ,t X b ,t ), output price ( Pi ,St = Pi ,t Pb ,t ) and input price ( Wi ,St = Wi ,t Wb ,t )
indices. This decomposition of spatial profitability highlights that, at any given time,
observed differences in profitability between firms can be explained by differences in
productivity, differences in price performance, or differences in both.
By definition spatial indices estimate firm i's performance relative to any
potential base firm b, and can therefore be employed to measure catch up in relative
performance. Thus, if we have access to data for the base year 1 and any other year t,
we can define and decompose an index of economic profitability catch up for any firm
i at time t and relative to the base firm b at period t, π i,Ct ,as follows:

π

C
i ,t

=

π iS,t
π

S
i ,1

=

TFPi ,St
S
i ,1

TFP

×

TPPi ,St
S
i ,1

TFP

=

Yi ,St

Pi ,St

Yi ,S1

Pi ,S1

X

×

S
i ,t

X iS,1

W

S
i ,t

=

Yi ,Ct
X

C
i ,t

×

Pi ,Ct
W

C
i ,t

= TFPi ,Ct × TPPi ,Ct

(3)

Wi ,S1

Thus, for firm i at time t, an index of economic profitability catch up, π i,Ct can be
expressed as a function of an index of total factor productivity catch up for firm i
relative to the base firm b, TFPi C,t and an index of total price performance catch up
relative to firm b, TPPi C,t . As TFPi ,Ct = Yi ,Ct X iC,t and TPPi C,t = Pi ,Ct Wi C,t these indices can
be further decomposed as functions of catch up indices for outputs ( Yi ,Ct = Yi ,St Yi ,S1 ),
inputs

( X iC,t = X iS,t X iS,1 ),

output

prices

( Pi ,Ct = Pi ,St Pi ,S1 )

and

input

prices

( Wi ,Ct = Wi ,St Wi ,S1 ). This decomposition of profitability catch up highlights that a firm’s
catch up in profitability can be explained not only by improving its productivity
performance relative to the base firm, but also by improving its price performance
relative to the base firm.
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2.3. Relative Profitability, Productivity and Price Performance Indices
We finally define the relationship between profits, productivity and price
performance for any firm i at any time t relative to a base firm b at the base time 1 .
As by construction these indices are measured relative to a constant base for all t and
all i , they therefore capture differences in both the spatial and the temporal
dimensions for any given firm at any given time.
As above, we define the economic profits of the base firm b at year 1, Π b ,1 , as
a ratio of its total revenues, Rb ,1 and total costs, C b ,1 , at year 1. Thus, the total
revenues of the base firm b at period 1 are defined as Rb ,1 = Pb ,1 × Yb ,1 , where Pb ,1 and
Yb ,1 present the output price index and the aggregate output index respectively at

period 1. Its total costs at year 1, C b ,1 , are defined as C b ,1 = Wb ,1 × X b ,1 , where Wb ,1
and X b ,1 denotes the input price index and the aggregate input index respectively of
the base firm at year 1. We can thus define and decompose a relative index of
economic profitability change at time t for firm i relative to the base firm b at time
1, π i,Rt , as follows:
Ri ,t

π =
R
i ,t

Π i ,t
Π b,1

Pi ,t Yi ,t

Yi ,t

Pi ,t

C i ,t
Wi ,t X i ,t
TFPi ,t TPPi ,t
Yb,1 Pb,1 Yi ,Rt Pi ,Rt
=
=
=
×
=
×
= R × R = TFPi ,Rt × TPPi ,Rt
Rb,1
Pb,1Yb,1
TFPb,1 TPPb,1 X i ,t Wi ,t
X i ,t Wi ,t
Cb,1 Wb,1 X b,1
X b,1 Wb,1

(4)

Thus, for firm i at time t, the relative economic profitability index, π i,Rt can be
expressed as a function of an index of relative total factor productivity for firm i at
time t relative to the base firm b at time 1, TFPi ,Rt ,and an index of total price
performance for firm i at time t relative to the base firm b at time 1,, TPPi ,Rt . As

TFPi ,Rt = Yi ,Rt X iR,t and TPPi ,Rt = Pi ,Rt Wi ,Rt these indices can be further decomposed as
functions of the relative output ( Yi ,Rt = Yi ,t Yb ,1 ), input ( X iR,t = X i ,t X b ,1 ), output price
( Pi ,Rt = Pi ,t Pb ,1 ) and input price ( Wi ,Rt = Wi ,t Wb,1 ) indices.
Given the binary definition of π i,Pt and its components ( TFPi ,Rt , TPPi ,Rt , Yi ,Rt ,

X iR,t , Pi ,Rt and Wi ,Rt ) these relative performance estimates are theoretically equivalent to
7
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2013

7

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 766 [2013]

the separate binary performance estimates provided by the unit-specific and spatial
performance

measures.

R
R
TPPiUS
,t = TPPi ,t TPPi ,1 ,

Thus,

as

R
R
YiUS
,t = Yi ,t Yi ,1 ,

R
R
π iUS
,t = π i ,t π i ,1 ,
R
R
X iUS
,t = X i ,t X i ,1 ,

R
R
TFPiUS
,t = TFPi ,t TFPi ,1 ,
R
R
PiUS
,t = Pi ,t Pi ,1

and

R
R
US
WiUS
,t = Wi ,t Wi ,1 it is straightforward to demonstrate that π i, t can be estimated and

fully decomposed as a function of relative performance measure estimates.
Yi ,Rt

π iUS
,t =

π iR,t Yi ,R1
Pi ,R1 TFPi ,Rt TPPi ,Rt
=
×
=
×
π iR,1 X iR,t Wi ,Rt TFPi ,R1 TPPi ,R1
X iR,1

Similarly,

as

Pi ,Rt
(5)

Wi ,R1

π iS,t = π iR,t π bR,t ,

TFPi ,St = TFPi ,Rt TFPbR,t ,

TPPi ,St = TPPi ,Rt TPPbR,t ,

Yi ,St = Yi ,Rt YbR,t , X iS,t = X iR,t X bR,t , Pi ,St = Pi ,Rt PbR,t and Wi ,St = Wi ,Rt WbR,t :
Yi ,Rt

π

S
i ,t

Pi ,Rt

π iR,t
YbR,t
PbR,t TFPi ,Rt TPPi ,Rt
= R = R × R =
×
π b ,t X i ,t Wi ,t TFPbR,t TPPbR,t
X bR,t

(6)

WbR,t

Estimates of π i,Ct can then be constructed with the underlying relative profitability
indices, and can in fact be constructed as the ratio of either unit specific or spatial
indices as defined in (5) and (6). This also clearly demonstrates that the catch up
index is, at its core, simply a ratio of unit specific profitability growth rates.

π iC,t =

π iS,t
π iS,1

π iR,t
π iR,t
πR
πR
π US,t
= bR,t = iR,1 = iUS
π i ,1
π b ,t
π b ,t
R
R
π b ,1
π b ,1

(7)

Moreover, by rearranging (7) and decomposing the profitability index we can write:
C
US
C
US
C
US
π iUS
, t = π i , t × π b, t = (TFPi , t × TFPb, t )× (TPPi , t × TPPb ,t )

(8)

Thus, given the availability of relative performance indices, the temporal economic
profitability of a firm i over time, π i,USt can be decomposed as a function of the
profitability growth of the base firm b , π b,USt and the profitability catch-up of the firm
8
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i relative to the base firm between year 1 and t, π i,Ct , e.g. profit performance of any

firm can be decomposed into a measure capturing the profit change of a reference
firm, and the given firm’s performance change relative to that reference firm.
Equation (8) therefore highlights the strong potential to apply this index based
approach to regulatory settings where it is desirable to not only measure firm
performance, but also to judge that performance relative to a base firm, normally
defined as a “best practice” or “benchmark” firm. Equation (8) previously developed
by Maziotis, Saal and Thanassoulis (2012) lacks the impact of exogenous factors like
quality in a profit decomposition analysis.
Therefore, as is well documented in past studies (see Saal & Parker 2000,
2001, Saal, Parker and Weyman-Jones, 2007, Maziotis, Saal and Thanassoulis 2009),
the English and Welsh water and sewerage companies have been obliged to carry
substantial capital investment projects in order to improve water and sewerage quality
and environmental standards. Saal and Parker (2001) and Maziotis, Saal and
Thanassoulis (2009) demonstrated that quality improvements do significantly impact
temporal and spatial productivity and price performance estimates. Thus, we feel it is
important to measure the impact of quality in our unit-specific, spatial and relative
profitability, productivity and price performance measures, thereby allowing for the
cross sectional and intertemporal variation in the sewage and drinking water quality.
We therefore calculate quality-adjusted measures of output, as the product of output
and a quality index following the approach of Saal and Parker (2000) and (2001),
Stone & Webster Consultants (2004), Saal et al, (2007), Maziotis, Saal and
Thanassoulis (2009). As a result, , quality is included in a profit decomposition
approach as an exogenous factor and is intended to control for changes over the
assesment period in water quality, environmental standards and characteristics that
reflect differences between firms in terms of their operating environment (Stone &
Webster Consultants, 2004).
Once the quality adjusted water and sewerage outputs are constructed, quality
adjusted indices are straightforward to produce, by first producing spatially consistent
quality adjusted output indices ( Yi ,St ,Q ). A spatial aggregate quality-adjusted
aggregated output price index is then constructed as Pi ,St ,Q = RiS,t Yi ,St ,Q . We can also

9
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derive a spatial implicit quality index ( QiS, t ) which measures the implied difference in
quality relative to the base firm as QiS,t = Yi ,St ,Q Yi ,St . Therefore, quality adjusted spatial
outputs and output prices can also be respectively expressed as Yi ,St ,Q = QiS,t Yi ,St and

Pi ,St ,Q = Pi ,St QiS,t , which illustrate that the impact on spatial output quantities will be
perfectly balanced by changes in spatial output prices. This also implies that measured
spatial economic profitability ( π i,St ) is not influenced by quality adjustment. In
contrast, the impact of quality adjustment implies that quality adjusted spatial TFP can
be expressed as

TFPi ,St ,Q = QiS,t TFPi ,St and similarly, quality adjusted spatial price

performance can be expressed as TPPi ,St ,Q = TPPi ,St / QiS,t and spatial economic
profitability can be decomposed as, π iS,t = TFPi ,St ,Q TPPi ,St ,Q .
In an analogous manner, we can derive measures of relative quality adjusted
output indices over time, Yi ,Rt ,Q and relative implicit quality index over time ( QiR,t )
which measures the implied difference in quality over time relative to the base firm at
the base period as QiR,t = Yi ,Rt,Q / Yi ,Rt . Therefore, measures of quality adjusted relative
outputs and output prices can also be expressed as Yi ,Rt,Q = QiR,t Yi ,Rt and Pi ,Rt ,Q = Pi ,Rt QiR,t .
Thus, quality adjusted relative TFP and TPP over time can be expressed as
and TPPi ,Rt ,Q = TPPi ,Rt / QiR,t , whereas the relative economic

TFP i ,Rt ,Q = Q iR,t TFP i ,Rt

profitability over time as π iR,t = TFPi ,Rt ,Q TPPi ,Rt,Q . This also implies that measured
relative economic profitability ( π i,Rt ) is not influenced by quality adjustment. Also,
we can produce measures of unit-specific quality adjusted output indices over time,
,Q
YiUS
and implicit quality index over time ( QiUS
,t
,t ) which measures the implied
US ,Q
/ YiUS
difference in unit-specific quality over time as QiUS
,t = Yi ,t
,t . Therefore, estimates

of temporal quality adjusted outputs and output prices can also be expressed as
,Q
US
,Q
YiUS
= QiUS
= PiUS
QiUS
and PiUS
,t
,t Yi ,t
,t
,t
,t . Thus, the quality adjusted unit-specific TFP

and

TPP

over

time

can

be

expressed

as

,Q
US
TFP i US
= Q iUS
,t
, t TFP i , t

and

,Q
US
TPPiUS
= TPPiUS
,t
,t / Qi ,t , while the unit-specific economic profitability over time
US ,Q
,Q
TPPiUS
.
as π iUS
,t = TFPi ,t
,t

10
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As stated above, our adjustment of output prices and quantities for quality
implies that any changes in the quality adjusted TPP index over time are balanced by
an equivalent proportional change in the quality adjusted TFP index over time,
thereby keeping the measurement of economic profitability unaffected by quality
adjustment. We wish to emphasize that this is a reasonable assumption. Firstly, taking
account of quality should not effect our underlying definition of economic
profitability as turnover divided by economic costs. Secondly, it reflects the
mathematical necessity that if turnover is constant, allowing for increases in output
resulting from quality improvements, must result in a perfectly proportional reduction
in output prices. Therefore, by adjusting TFP and TPP measures for quality keeping
economic profitability unchanged, we are able to offer an alternative decomposition
of unit-specific profitability growth, which will more properly attribute quality
improvements to productivity improvement, rather than to over estimated
improvements in price performance that would result from a quality-unadjusted
measure. Moreover, as we will illustrate, this allows a further decomposition of
equation (8) into the catch-up in quality regarding productivity and price performance
achieved by less productivity firms and the quality growth in productivity and price
performance of the base firm in a multilateral context.
Given the derivation of the spatial implicit output quality index ( QiS, t ) which
measures the implied difference in quality relative to the base firm, we are able to
construct measures of the catch-up in quality, QiC,t , as a ratio of the spatial implicit
quality index for any firm i to the base firm between year 1 and t, QiC,t =

QiS,t
QiS,1

.

R
Moreover, given the availability of QiS,t , QiUS
,t and Qi ,t the catch up in quality can be

expressed in a similar manner to what was demonstrated in equation (7):
Q iR,t
Q iC,t =

Q iS,t
Q iS,1

=

Q bR,t
Q iR,1
Q bR,1

Q iR,t
=

Q iR,1
Q bR,t

=

Q iUS
,t
Q bUS,t

(9)

Q bR,1

11
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Rearranging (9), we can express the unit-specific quality index of any firm i over time
as a function of the catch-up in quality to the base firm and the quality improvement
C
US
of the base firm, QiUS
,t = Qi ,t Qb ,t .

Given our discussion of our approach to quality adjustment, the decomposition
of firm specific economic profitability change detailed in (8) can now be extended, in
the multilateral context, as follows:
C US
C
US
C
US
π iUS
,t = π i ,t π b,t = (TFPi ,t TFPb ,t )(TPPi ,t TPPb,t )

(

)(

) (

)(

,Q
,Q
,Q
,Q
= TFPiUS
TPPiUS
= TFPi,Ct ,QTFPbUS
TPPi,Ct ,QTPPbUS
,t
,t
,t
,t

(

= TFP Q
C
i ,t

C
i ,t

)(TFP

US
b,t

US
b,t

Q

)

(8’)

 TPPi,Ct  TPPbUS

,t



 QC  QUS 
 i,t  b,t 

)

Thus, as in (8), in the first line of (8’), unit-specific economic profitability change,

π i,USt , can be decomposed as a function of the quality unadjusted catch-up in
productivity, TFPi ,Ct and the productivity growth of the benchmark firm, TFPbUS
,t and
the quality unadjusted catch-up in price performance, TPPi C,t

and the price

performance growth of the benchmark firm, TPPbUS
,t By including quality in TFP and
TPP measures, in the second line of equation (8’), the unit-specific economic
profitability over time can be expressed as a function of the unit-specific quality
,Q
adjusted productivity, TFPiUS
and quality-adjusted price performance change,
,t
,Q
TPPiUS
. This can be further decomposed as a function of the quality adjusted catch,t

up in productivity, TFPi ,Ct ,Q and the quality adjusted productivity growth of the
,Q
benchmark firm, TFPbUS
and the quality adjusted catch-up in price performance,
,t

TPPi ,Ct ,Q and the quality adjusted price performance growth of the benchmark firm,
,Q
TPPbUS
. Finally, the third line of (8’) demonstrates the impact of quality in TFP and
,t

TPP measures over time. Thus, unit-specific economic profitability change, π i,USt , can
be decomposed as a function of the quality unadjusted catch-up in productivity,

TFPi ,Ct , the catch-up in quality regarding productivity, QiC,t and the quality-unadjusted
12
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productivity and quality performance over time of the benchmark firm, TFPbUS
,t and

QbUS,t and the quality unadjusted catch-up in price performance, TPPi C,t the catch-up in
quality regarding price performance, 1 / QiC,t and the price performance and quality
US
C
C
growth of the benchmark firm, TPPbUS
,t and 1 / Qb ,t . If TFPi ,t > 1 or TPPi ,t > 1 , then firm

i improved its productivity or price performance relative to the base firm from year 1

to t, whereas a value lower than 1 indicates that productivity or price performance of
firm i has declined relative to that of the base firm. If QiC,t > 1 or 1 / QiC,t < 1 , then the
firm i improved its quality regarding productivity or price performance relative to the
base firm from year 1 to year t, whereas a value lower than 1 indicates that relative
quality regarding productivity or price performance of firm i has declined relative to
that of the base firm.
Finally, the decomposition of the unit specific economic profitability over time
in equation (8’) can be visualized in Figure 1. As adjustments for quality affect the
productivity and price performance measures leaving the measured economic
profitability unchanged, the unit-specific profitability growth can be expressed as a
function of the unit-specific quality adjusted productivity and quality-adjusted price
performance change. This can be further decomposed as a function of the quality
adjusted catch-up in productivity, and the quality adjusted productivity growth of the
benchmark firm, and the quality adjusted catch-up in price performance, and the
quality adjusted price performance growth of the benchmark firm. The inclusion of
quality in our analysis allows us to finally decompose unit-specific economic
profitability change as a function of the quality unadjusted catch-up in productivity,
the catch-up in quality regarding productivity, and the quality-unadjusted productivity
and quality performance over time of the benchmark firm, and the quality unadjusted
catch-up in price performance, the catch-up in quality regarding price performance,
and the price performance and quality growth of the benchmark firm.

13
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2013

13

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 766 [2013]

Quality Unadjusted
Productivity

Catch-Up
Quality Adjusted
Productivity

Quality Catch-Up

Catch-Up
Quality Unadjusted Benchmark
Productivity

Quality Adjusted
Productivity
Change
Quality Adjusted Benchmark
Unit Specific
Economic
Profitability Change

Productivity

Quality Benchmark
Change

Quality Unadjusted Price
Performance
Quality Adjusted
Price Performance
Change

Quality Adjusted
Price Performance
Catch-Up

Quality Adjusted
Benchmark Price
Performance Change

Catch-Up
1/Quality
Catch-Up
Quality Unadjusted Benchmark
Price Performance

1/Quality Benchmark
Change

Figure 1 Decomposition of Unit Specific Economic Profitability Change after Adjustments for Quality

14
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper766

14

Maziotis et al.: Profit, Productivity, Price and Quality Performance Changes

2.3. Multilateral Productivity, Price Performance and Profitability
Computations In Practice
2.3.1. Chained Unit-specific Productivity, Price Performance and Profitability Over
Time

In this section we define chained unit-specific profitability, productivity and
price performance growth. Temporal Fisher output and input indexes between two
time periods 1 and t , where 1 is the base period in the case of m outputs and n inputs
for a firm i are respectively, Yi ,t and X i ,t , :
M

Yi ,t = [

∑ P1mYt m
m =1
M

∑P
m =1

m m
1
1

Y

M

×

N

∑ Pt mYt m
m =1
M

∑P
m =1

t

]
m

1
2

m
1

Y

X i ,t = [

∑W1n X tn
n =1
N

∑W
n =1

n
1

X

n
1

N

×

∑W

n

∑W

n

n =1
N

n =1

t

t

X tn
]
X

1
2

(10)

n
1

where Yt m and Y1m denote the quantities for the mth output for periods t and 1
respectively, whereas X tn and X 1n present the quantities for the nth inputs for
periods t and 1 respectively. Moreover, Pt m and P1m are the prices for mth output,
while Wt n and W1n denote the input prices. The Fisher output and input indexes of a
firm i between two time periods, 1 and t , can also be expressed as the geometric
means of Laspeyers and Paasche output and input indexes. A temporal Fisher
productivity index, TFPi ,t is constructed as a ratio of Fisher output index relative to
Fisher input index, which takes the value 1 in the year 1 (base period):

TFPi ,t =

Yi ,t

(11)

X i ,t

A temporal Fisher productivity index can be used in the unchained form denoted
above or in a chained form where weights are more closely matched to pair-wise
comparisons of observations (Diewert & Lawrence, 2006). The unit-specific output
CH
and input indices are thus chained indices, Yi ,CH
between observations 1 and
t and X i ,t

t which are given by:

Yi ,CH
= 1 × Yi ,1, 2 × Yi , 2,3 × ... × Yi ,t −1,t
t

X iCH
,t = 1 × X i ,1, 2 × X i , 2 , 3 × ... × X i ,t −1,t

(12)
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The unit-specific productivity of a firm i over time can be similarly calculated as a
chained index, although it can be equivalently calculated as a ratio of the chained
CH
unit-specific output and input indices over time, Yi ,CH
t and X i ,t :

CH
i ,t

TFP

=

Yi CH
,t

(13)

X iCH
,t

Given these chained unit-specific indexes, we can proceed to derive related
TPP and Profitability indices as in Saal and Parker (2001). To derive TPP index we
firstly express unit-specific turnover at period t relative to the base year 1 as

(

)

CH
RiUS
is then
,t = Ri ,t / Ri ,1 . The chained unit-specific aggregate output price index, Pi ,t

calculated as Pi CH
= RiUS
Yi CH
,t
,t
,t . Similarly, we express unit-specific nominal economic
costs at period t relative to the base year 1 as C iUS
,t = C i ,t / C i ,1 . The chained unit-

(

)

specific aggregate input price index, Wi CH
is then calculated as Wi ,CH
= C iUS
X iCH
,t
t
,t
,t .

(

Finally, a chained unit-specific TPP index for any firm i over time, TPPi CH
,t

) can be

obtained as:

RiUS
,t
TPPi ,CH
=
t

Yi ,CH
t
C iUS
,t

=

Pi ,CH
t
Wi ,CH
t

(14)

X iCH
,t
Therefore, a chained unit-specific economic profitability index at period t relative to
the base year 1 , π i,CH
is calculated as the product of a chained index of unit-specific
t
and a chained unit-specific index of total
total factor productivity over time, TFPi CH
,t
price performance over time, TPPi CH
,t .
2.3.2. Spatial Productivity, Price Performance and Profitability

In the previous section, we used a chained Fisher index to measure
profitability, productivity and price performance of any firm between period 1 and
period t. In this section, we derive a multilateral Fisher index to measure profitability,
productivity and price performance across companies at any given year (multilateral
spatial comparisons). When the price and quantities across different companies are
16
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compared, it is important that such comparisons are undertaken for every pair of
companies being considered (multilateral comparisons). However, in order to achieve
consistency between all the pairs of comparisons we need to derive multilateral
indexes that fulfill the property of transitivity. Internal consistency (transitivity)
implies that a direct comparison between two firms gives the same result when
comparing indirectly these two firms through a third firm.
Therefore, binary Fisher output and input indices between two firms i and
j , Yi , j and X i , j can be converted into multilateral consistent transitive indices by

applying the EKS method developed by Elteto-Koves (1964) and Szulc (1964) to
derive transitive Fisher indices (see Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982a), Diewert
and Lawrence (2006) and Ball et al (2001) for a discussion on multilateral transitive
indices). We therefore derive transitive Fisher output and input indices using the EKS
method, which is equivalent to taking the geometric mean of the I possible direct and
indirect (through any possible 3rd firm k) binary Fisher comparisons of firms i and j.
The resulting Fisher output and input indices, YijS and X ijS therefore fulfill the
transitivity property:
I

[

YijS = ∏ Yik × Ykj
k =1

]

1
I

I

[

X ijS = ∏ X ik × X kj
k =1

]

1
I

(15)

Adopting the terminology of the price index literature (Hill, 2004) we refer to these
multilateral output and input indices as spatial indices, as they provide spatially
consistent measures across all firms.
The spatial total factor productivity Fisher index for a firm i relative to firm j ,

TFPi ,Sj , can then be constructed as the ratio of the spatial Fisher output index relative
to spatial Fisher input index:

TFP

S
ij

=

Y ijS
X ijS

(16)

While we can generate the I × I possible transitive spatial output, input and
productivity indexes between all firms, transitivity also implies that all meaningful
information with regard to relative productivity is available in a subset of only I of
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these indices. Thus, if we arbitrarily choose one firm as a base firm and set j = b , then
each spatial measure, is a measure of firm i relative to the chosen base firm and we
can also simplify notation such that TFPi ,Sb = TFPi S , Yi ,Sb = Yi S , X iS,b = X iS . Therefore,
productivity relative to the base firm’s productivity can be expressed as:

TFP i S =

Yi S
X iS

(17)

However, this simplification comes at no loss of generality as another spatial
productivity measure between any given firms can simply be calculated as

TFPi ,Sj = TFPi S / TFPjS . Similarly, Yi ,Sj = Yi S / Y jS and X iS, j = X iS / X Sj .
If spatial comparisons are available for each of T time periods indexed by t ,
and we assume the same base firm in all years, we can define the spatial productivity
of firm i relative to firm b at time t as:

TFP =
S
i ,t

Yi ,St

(18)

X iS,t

We now turn our discussion to the construction of the spatial total price performance

(

)

index, TPPi ,St . Firstly, we express turnover of a firm i relative to the base firm as

RiS,t = Ri ,t Rb ,t . The spatially consistent aggregate output price index, (Pi ,St ) is then
calculated as Pi ,St = RiS,t Yi ,St . Similarly, we express nominal economic costs of a firm i
relative to the base firm as CiS,t = Ci ,t Cb ,t . The spatially consistent aggregate input

( )

price index, Wi ,St is then calculated as Wi ,St = CiS,t X iS,t . Finally, a spatially consistent

(

)

TPP index of any firm i relative to the base firm at any given time t, TPPi ,St can be
obtained as:

RiS,t
TPPi ,St =

Yi ,St
CiS,t

=

Pi ,St
Wi ,St

(19)

X iS,t
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Therefore, a spatial economic profitability index at time t, π iS,t is calculated as the
product of an index of spatial total factor productivity for firm i relative to the base
firm b, TFPi ,St and a spatial index of total price performance between firm i and the
base firm b, TPPi ,St .
2.3.3. Relative Productivity, Price Performance and Profitability Change Over Time

In order to simultaneously measure and decompose the profitability growth of
any firm in the sample across time and relative to other firms, in practice it is
necessary to reconcile the spatial profitability measures defined above with the
underlying unit-specific chained profitability of each firm. This is because while
section 2 has theoretically demonstrated that relative productivity measures can be
expressed as a function of unit-specific and spatial productivity measures, this is not
as straightforward in a multilateral empirical application. Thus, as demonstrated by
Hill (2004) we cannot, in practice, derive multilateral measures of the productive
change of any firm i relative to the base firm, which can satisfy both spatial and
temporal consistency.2
We have therefore chosen to pursue measures of relative productivity change
over time that guarantee spatial consistency, as this approach is most consistent in the
regulatory application we demonstrate below. Thus regulators in comparative or yard
stick regulatory regimes typically employ cross section techniques to measure
differences in productivity or efficiency across firms (relative comparative
performance) and therefore use what are, in fact, spatial performance measures to
inform their decision with regard to appropriate regulated prices. Thus, as our applied
relative performance measures retain spatial consistency by construction, the relative
performance indices will yield comparative performance measures that are consistent
with regulatory practice in any given year. However, because our relative measures
will also allow intertemporal analysis across firms, they have the advantage of
allowing a more detailed analysis of firm performance change over time, which is not
possible with a spatial index alone. .

2

Spatially consistency implies that each year’s relative productivity measures do not depend on the
other years in the comparison and temporal consistency implies that each firm’s productivity estimates
do not depend on the number of observations in the time series
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Given these arguments, we follow Hill’s approach (2004). Therefore, firm i's
relative productivity change over time ( TFPi ,Rt ) is determined as the geometric average
of the I alternative potential estimates of relative productivity, as derived by
employing the chained time trends and spatial productivities of all the I firms in the
sample:
1

 I 
TFPi ,St   I
S
TFPi ,Rt = ∏ (TFPjCH
×
TFP
)
×

,t
j ,1
TFPjS,t  
 j =1 

(20)

Thus, when i = j, TFPi ,Rt can be simply expressed as the product of the firm’s own
chained productivity index and its spatial productivity measure in year 1:
S
R
TFPi ,Rt = TFPi ,CH
t TFPi ,1 . In contrast, for the alternative I-1 estimates when, i ≠ j . TFPi ,t

can also be expressed as a function of any other firm j’s relative productivity index
S
calculated as TFPjR,t = TFPjCH
,t TFPj ,1 , and the spatial productivity of firm i relative to

firm j, which given the definition of our spatial productivity measures, can be
expressed as

TFPi ,St
TFPjS,t

. Thus, rather than relying on a single one of these potential

estimates, the definition of TFPi ,Pt in (20) employs all available spatial and chained
productivity estimates to provide an arguably superior geometric average estimate of
TFPi ,Rt . We can similarly derive measures of the relative output and input indices over

time, Yi ,Rt and X iR,t .
Following our approach in (4) these relative measures are indices of any firm i
measured relative to the base firm in the base year. Construction of consistent price,
and TPP indices can therefore be accomplished by firstly expressing turnover of firm i
relative to the base firm at the base year 1 as RiR,t = Ri ,t Rb,1 . The relative aggregate

( )

output price index over time, Pi ,Rt is then calculated as Pi ,Rt = RiR,t Yi ,Rt . Similarly, we
express nominal economic costs of a firm i relative to the base firm at the base year 1

( )

as CiR,t = C i ,t Cb ,1 . The relative aggregate input price index over time, Wi ,Rt is then
calculated as Wi ,Rt = CiR,t X iR,t . Finally, a relative TPP index of any firm i relative to

(

)

the base firm at the base year 1, TPPi ,Rt can be obtained as:
20
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RiR,t
TPP =
R
i ,t

Yi ,Rt

=

C iR,t

Pi ,Rt

(21)

Wi ,Rt

X iR,t
As a result, a relative economic profitability index, π i,Rt can be calculated as the
product of an index of relative total factor productivity for firm i relative to the base
firm b at base year 1, TFPi ,Rt and a relative index of total price performance between
firm i and the base firm b at the base year 1, TPPi ,Rt .
In order to achieve our ultimate goal of decomposing unit specific profit
growth in the multilateral context, as demonstrated in (8) in the bilateral context, we
must finally derive unit specific indices which are consistent with the relative indices
developed in (20) and (21). We therefore calculate a consistent measure of unitUS
i ,t

specific productivity over time, which can be obtained as TFP

=

TFPi ,Rt
TFPi ,R1

. Similarly,

consistent measures of unit-specific output and input growth are respectively

YiUS
,t =

Yi ,Rt
Yi,1R

and X iUS
,t =

X iR,t
R
X i,1

. In an analogous manner, consistent measures of unit-

specific TPP output price, input price and economic profitability indexes are
US
i ,t

respectively, TPP

=

TPPi ,Rt
R
i ,1

TPP

US
i ,t

, P

=

Pi ,Rt
R
i,1

US
i ,t

,W

P

=

Wi ,Rt
R
i,1

W

US
US
and π iUS
.
,t = TFPi ,t TPPi ,t

Given our modeling decision to maintain spatial consistency at the cost of
temporal consistency, and the subsequent employment of the geometric average of the

I alternative potential relative indicators as appropriate unit specific relative
productivity, output and input indices, we must note that the unit-specific chained
temporal indexes will, by construction, not be perfectly consistent with the unit
specific temporal indexes constructed from the multilateral relative indices.
Nevertheless, it can be readily mathematically demonstrated that the geometric
average of the I chained unit specific temporal indices and those derived from the
relative indices detailed in equations (25) and (26) are equal. Thus, for example, if we
take

the

geometric

average

across

all

firms

I

in

the

sample,

then
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(

)

1
I

(

)

1
I

(

)

1
I

(

)

1
I





CH 
US 
CH 
US 
∏ TFPi ,t  = ∏ TFPi ,t  , and ∏ TPPi ,t  = ∏ TPPi ,t  . This implies
 i =1

 i =1

 i =1

 i =1

I

I

I

I

that while our approach to deriving the relative indicators necessary to decompose
unit-specific trends in firm performance can result in minor deviations from the
temporal trends implied by the unit-specific chained indices, we can nonetheless be
fully confident that on average, the unit specific estimates are consistent with the
underlying chain-based estimates of temporal change in firm performance. We
therefore, focus on these average estimates and their decomposition in our results
below.
This section has specified a methodology to allow the empirical application of
unit-specific, spatial and relative economic profitability indices and their
decomposition into unit-specific, spatial and relative productivity and price
performance indices in a multilateral setting by reconciling together temporal chained
and spatial indices, following Hill’s approach (2004). Moreover, we have
demonstrated that these estimates are not only spatially consistent, but are also, on
average, consistent with alternative unit-specific chained indices of temporal
performance change. Thus, this section has demonstrated an appropriate methodology
to allow for decompositions of profitability indices in a multilateral setting, thereby
extending the approach illustrated in equations (1), (2) and (3) in the binary context.
Consequently, we are able to consistently decompose unit specific profitability
change as a function of the profitability growth of a base firm and profitability catchup relative to that firm over time, which can be further decomposed as a function of
the productivity and price performance of a base firm and productivity and price
performance catch-up relative to that firm over time, in a multilateral setting, as
illustrated in equation (8) in the binary context. Finally, it can be easily proven that by
adjusting output with quality we can also extend equation (8’) in a multilateral setting.

4. Data
Our model includes separate outputs for water and sewerage services, and the
three inputs, capital, labor and other inputs. The data covered are for the period 19912008 for a balanced panel of 10 Water and Sewerage companies (WaSCs). Water
connected properties and sewerage connected properties are the proxies for water and
sewerage output and are drawn from the companies’ regulatory returns to Ofwat,
22
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which are used to construct the output indices. These binary output indices then
formed the basis of constructing fully spatially consistent output indices with the EKS
method. Finally, spatially consistent aggregate output price indices were constructed
as the ratio of relative aggregate turnover in nominal terms to this spatial aggregate
output index, as discussed above.
Our physical capital stock measure is based on the inflation adjusted Modern
Equivalent Asset (MEA) estimates of the replacement cost of physical assets
contained in the companies’ regulatory accounts. However, as periodic revaluations of
these replacement cost values could create arbitrary changes in our measure of
physical capital, we cannot directly employ these accounting based measures.
Instead, we accept the year ending 2006 MEA valuations as our base value, and use
net investment in real terms to update this series for earlier and later years. Real net
investment is therefore taken as the sum of disposals, additions, investments and
depreciation, as deflated by the Construction Output Price Index (COPI). Following
Saal and Parker’s (2001) approach, we averaged the resulting year ending and year
beginning estimates to provide a more accurate estimate of the average physical
capital stock available to the companies in a given year.
We subsequently employed a user-cost of capital approach, to calculate total
capital costs as the sum of the opportunity cost of invested capital and capital
depreciation relative to the MEA asset values, and construct the price of physical
capital as the user cost of capital divided by the above MEA based measure of
physical capital stocks. The opportunity cost of capital is defined as the product of the
weighted average cost of capital (WACC) before tax and the companies’ average
Regulatory Capital Value (RCV). The RCV is the financial measure of capital stock
accepted by Ofwat for regulatory purposes. The WACC calculation is broadly
consistent with Ofwat’s regulatory assumptions and is estimated with the risk free
return assumed to be the average annual yields of medium-term UK inflation indexed
gilts. The risk premium for company equity and corporate debt was assumed to be 2%
following Ofwat’s approach at past price reviews. We also allowed for differences in
company gearing ratios and effective corporate tax rates, which were calculated as the
sum of aggregate current and deferred tax divided by the aggregate current cost profit
before taxation. Finally, following the approach in Ofwat’s regulatory current cost
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accounts, capital depreciation was the sum of current cost depreciation and
infrastructure renewals charge.
The average number of full-time equivalent (FTE) employees is available
from the companies’ statutory accounts. Firm specific labour prices were calculated
as the ratio of total labour costs to the average number of full-time equivalent
employees. Other costs in nominal terms were defined as the difference between
operating costs and total labour costs.3 Given the absence of data allowing a more
refined break out of other costs, we employ the UK price index for materials and fuel
purchased in purification and distribution of water, as the price index for other costs,
and simply deflate nominal other costs by this measure to obtain a proxy for real
usage of other inputs. Given these input quantity and price measures, we are able to
calculate indices of unit-specific, spatial and relative input usage discussed above. As
total nominal economic costs are obtained as the sum of total capital costs, labour
costs and other costs in nominal terms, division of this sum by the unit-specific,
spatial and relative input index, allows the construction of unit-specific, spatial and
relative input price indices. Finally, economic profits are calculated as the difference
between turnover and calculated economic costs.
Following Saal and Parker (2001) the drinking water quality index is
calculated as the ratio of the average percentage of each WaSC’s water supply zones
that are fully compliant with key water quality parameters, relative to the average
compliance percentage for England and Wales in 1991. Water supply zones are areas
designated by the water companies by reference to a source of supply in which not
more than 50,000 people reside. The data were drawn from the DWI’s annual reports
for drinking water quality for the calendar years ending 1991-20074. The drinking
water quality can be defined either based on the sixteen water quality parameters or
nine water quality parameters identified as being important for aesthetic, health

3

While it would be particularly desirable to disaggregate other input usage data further and in
particular to allow for separate energy and chemical usage inputs, the data available at company level
from Ofwat’s regulatory return does not allow a further meaningful decomposition of other input
usage.
4
The DWI provides quality data based on calendar years, while all other information employed in this
paper is based on fiscal years ending March 31st. We note this inconsistency in the data, but emphasize
that the reported years overlap each other for 9 months. Thus, the year end to year end estimates of
quality change obtained from the DWI data provide consistent estimates of quality change by the water
companies, at a fixed point 9 months into each fiscal year.
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reasons and cost reasons or based on based on the six water quality parameters
identified as being indicative of how well treatment works and distribution systems
are operated and maintained. Due to changes in some of the drinking water quality
standards and the new regulations, the DWI report for 2005 no longer included the
two quality indices that compared companies’ compliance for the sixteen or nine
water quality parameters with the average for England and Wales. So we decided to
report results for the drinking water quality based on the six water quality parameters5
that Ofwat also employs in his assessment and reflect how well treatment works and
distribution systems are operated and maintained (Ofwat, 2006).
The sewage treatment quality index is defined as a weighted index of the
percentage of connected population for which sewage receives primary treatment and
the percentage of population for which sewage receives at least secondary treatment.
It also implicitly includes the percentage of connected population for which sewage is
not treated with a zero weight. This data choice reflects both the availability of
consistent data capturing quality trends for the entire 1991-2008 period, and does
clearly capture substantial increases in sewage treatment levels, particularly in the
earlier part of the sample period. The sewage treatment data were taken from

Waterfacts for the first years 1990-91 to 1995-96 and the companies’ regulatory
returns for the fiscal years 1996-97 to 2007-08. Moreover, we henceforward refer to
data based on the ending year of the fiscal years.
It is clearly necessary to employ a weighted index of these measures as both
the quality and costs of higher treatment levels exceed those associated with non
treatment or primary treatment alone. We therefore endeavoured to construct a cost
based weighting system, although the necessary data to accomplish this was relatively
limited. However, we were able to calculate relative cost measures based on the ratio
of sewerage treatment costs to volumes of sewerage treatment, using two alternative
cost estimates available from company regulatory returns. One of these alternative
estimates was based on total sewerage treatment functional expenditure and direct
costs for all treatment works, while the other was based on total sewage treatment

5

The six water quality parameters, which form the Operational Performance Index (OPI) are iron,
manganese, aluminium, turbidity, faecal coliforms and trihalomethanes. The resulting drinking water
quality index suggests an increase in quality of 10.3 percent between 1991 and 2008 after aggregating
the data for all WaSCs.
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costs for large treatment works only. These estimates suggest that higher levels of
treatment are 1.68 to 2.40 times more costly than primary treatment only. Given this
estimate range, we chose to weight the percentage of population receiving secondary
treatment of sewage or more twice as much as the percentage receiving primary
treatment only. While admittedly, somewhat ad hoc, we emphasize there is some
empirical evidence to support these weights. We note that it is straightforward to
demonstrate that the resulting weighted quality index is nested between an index
based solely on the percentage of population receiving at least primary sewage
treatment, which would underestimate gains in sewage treatment quality, and one
based solely on the percentage of population receiving at least secondary sewage
treatment, which would overestimate gains in sewage treatment quality.

5. Results from productivity, price performance and profitability after
controlling for quality
The above spatial and relative profitability, productivity and price
performance measures were defined relative to the base firm in the sample. However,
if the base firm is defined as the firm with the highest productivity in the sample, then
each firm’s productivity, prices and profits will be relative to this best practice or
benchmark firm.6 In this section we first report geometric average measures of unitspecific profitability, productivity and price performance. Consequently, we
decompose theses changes into an average catch-up component and the performance
of the benchmark firm as illustrated in equation (8).
Figure 2 illustrates the decomposition of unit-specific economic profitability
change into quality adjusted unit-specific productivity and price performance change
over the period 1991-2008. The results indicate that between 1991 and 2008, average
economic profitability increased by 5.9%, which was attributed to a significant
improvement in TFP of 51.7% and a reduction in TPP of 30.2%. On average there

6

We have not identified firms for confidentially reasons. The same firm is consistently found to have
the highest spatial productivity estimates in all years, and is therefore modelled as the benchmark most
productive firm in each year of our study Moreover, we note that his same firm was found to have the
highest spatial productivity estimates in each year of the study regardless of whether we applied the
spatially consistent Fisher indices provided in the main text, similar spatially consistent Tornqvist
indices, or the multilateral translog index for WaSCs based on the Tornqvist index developed by Caves
et al (1982a). Furthermore, there is little substantive difference between the results regardless of which
method is employed.
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was a stable and substantial increase in TFP over time, while TPP followed an upward
trend until 1994, which was interrupted in 1995, but was again followed by a
substantial increase between 1999 and 2000. We note that during the years 19911995, average economic profitability increased due to increases in TPP which was
substantially greater than TFP growth. As documented in previous studies, Ofwat’s
tightening of price caps in the 1994 price review decreased the growth in real output
prices and therefore resulted in a downward trend for both TPP and economic
profitability until 1998, while TFP continued to improve significantly. After 2000,
reduced output prices caused TPP to dramatically decline, and its value remained
consistently below 1 after 2000. This indicates that regulatory price changes
implemented after 2000 caused the price performance of firms to fall substantially
below its level in 1991. Moreover, average unit-specific TPP followed a downward
trend except for 2006, when output prices were allowed to momentarily rise in the
first year of the 2006-10 regulatory period. Unsurprisingly, given the dramatic fall in
price performance after 2000, average economic profitability also substantially
declined, even if TFP continued to follow a steady upward trend, which was only
momentarily interrupted in 2007. Thus, in the post 2000 period, trends in temporal
economic profitability followed the trend of TPP, indicating that changes in price
performance were a significant determinant of changes in economic profitability.

1.7
1.6
1.5
1.4
1.3
1.2
1.1
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Economic Profitability 1.000 1.102 1.1861.234 1.205 1.170 1.2171.206 1.244 1.326 1.069 1.1501.082 1.050 1.054 1.1381.064 1.059
Quality Adjusted TFP 1.000 1.011 1.0461.067 1.086 1.119 1.1561.197 1.236 1.254 1.370 1.4011.424 1.442 1.493 1.5161.501 1.517
Quality Adjusted TPP 1.000 1.090 1.1341.156 1.109 1.045 1.0521.008 1.007 1.058 0.780 0.8210.760 0.729 0.706 0.7500.709 0.698

Figure 2 Decomposition of Average Unit Specific Profitability into Average Quality Adjusted
Unit Specific TFP and TPP
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Moreover, Figure 3 depicts the decomposition of quality adjusted average TFP
change into quality unadjusted average TFP change and quality change. High capital
investment programs to improve quality conditions since privatization had a positive
impact on quality adjusted output growth and consequently, quality adjusted TFP
increased more than quality unadjusted TFP. Over the whole regulatory period
average quality adjusted TFP improved by 51.7%, whereas average quality unadjusted
TFP improved by only 22.9% implying that average estimated quality change
amounted to 23.4%. Much of the measured quality improvement occurred during the
years 1991-2002 and quality showed its highest level of improvement in the years
1999 and 2002. Thus, by 2002, average quality improved by 22% resulting in an
increase in average quality adjusted TFP of 40.1% and exceeded average quality
unadjusted TFP which improved by only 14.8%. After 2003, on average there were
small improvements in quality and thus, small changes in the quality adjusted TFP
growth rate, whereas in the last two years of our study average quality followed a
slightly decline trend. Nevertheless productivity still continued to improve in this later
period, suggesting that firms were able to achieve productivity improvements by
reducing input usage.

1.7
1.6
1.5
1.4
1.3
1.2
1.1
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Quality Adjusted TFP 1.000 1.011 1.046 1.067 1.086 1.119 1.156 1.197 1.236 1.254 1.370 1.401 1.424 1.442 1.493 1.516 1.501 1.517
Quality Unadjusted TFP 1.000 1.006 1.021 1.029 1.039 1.072 1.100 1.126 1.140 1.120 1.150 1.148 1.157 1.168 1.209 1.220 1.215 1.229
Quality

1.000 1.006 1.025 1.037 1.045 1.044 1.051 1.063 1.084 1.120 1.191 1.220 1.231 1.234 1.235 1.243 1.236 1.234

Figure 3 Decomposition of Average Unit Specific Quality Adjusted TFP Change into Average
Unit-Specific TFP and Quality Change

Figure 4 displays the decomposition of quality adjusted average unit-specific
TPP change into quality unadjusted average TPP change and quality change. Since
28
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output prices are adjusted for quality as we discussed in section 2, on average the
magnitude of change in quality adjusted TPP must exceed that of quality unadjusted
TPP. We would therefore emphasize that the quality adjusted TPP index must also
follow the general trend of the quality-unadjusted index, but it also must demonstrate
a more significant decline in price performance, as it allows for the output enhancing
impact of quality improvements. During the lax price cap period 1991-1994, increases
in quality unadjusted TPP exceeded the quality adjusted TPP implying that increases
in output prices were greater than the quality adjusted output prices. This upward
trend was interrupted in 1995 followed by a downward trend until 1998, whereas
during the years 1999-2000 average quality unadjusted TPP and quality adjusted TPP
started to increase again. The tightened 1999 price review obliged the companies to
reduce their output prices and the magnitude of the reduction in quality adjusted TPP
was significantly greater than the quality unadjusted TPP on average. Between the
years 2000 and 2001 there was a significant fall in average quality unadjusted TPP
and quality adjusted TPP by 0.930/1.184 = 0.785 or 21.5% and 0.780/1.058 = 0.737
or 26.3% respectively. After 2001, there was a downward trend for average quality
unadjusted and quality adjusted TPP except for the years 2002 and 2006, where new
looser price caps were introduced. We note that after 1998, on average quality
adjusted TPP took a value lower than 1 implying that after controlling for quality the
reduction in quality adjusted output prices was greater than the quality unadjusted
output prices and therefore, relative to 1991, by 2008 average quality adjusted TPP
reduced by 30.2%, whereas average quality unadjusted TPP declined by 13.9%,
implying that the impact of average quality in output prices and therefore in average
TPP was approximately 19%. Thus, Figure 4 clearly suggests that, while quality
improvements have contributed to the productivity performance of the WaSCs, they
have also contributed negatively to their price performance.
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1.7
1.6
1.5
1.4
1.3
1.2
1.1
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
Quality Adjusted TPP

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1.000 1.090 1.134 1.156 1.109 1.045 1.052 1.008 1.007 1.058 0.780 0.821 0.760 0.729 0.706 0.750 0.709 0.698

Quality Unadjusted TPP 1.000 1.096 1.162 1.199 1.160 1.091 1.106 1.072 1.091 1.184 0.930 1.002 0.936 0.899 0.872 0.933 0.876 0.861
1/Quality

1.000 0.994 0.976 0.964 0.957 0.958 0.952 0.941 0.923 0.893 0.840 0.819 0.813 0.810 0.810 0.805 0.809 0.810

Figure 4 Decomposition of Average Units Specific Quality Adjusted TPP Change into Average
Unit-Specific TPP and Quality Change

The decomposition of quality adjusted average unit-specific productivity
growth into the quality adjusted productivity growth of the benchmark firm and
average quality adjusted productivity catch-up is depicted in Figure 5. The figure
clearly illustrates that until 1994 there were small or no catch up gains in qualityadjusted productivity by the average company since its productivity improved by
6.7%, while the benchmark company improved its productivity by 7.1%. In contrast,
due to sharp increases in measure quality between 1996 and 2002, average quality
adjusted TFP increased more rapidly than benchmark quality adjusted TFP, thereby
allowing the average company to catch-up considerably, with catch up amounting to
19.5% of cumulative productivity growth for the average firm by 2002. Even after
2002 the average company achieved still significant levels of catch-up in quality
adjusted productivity until 2005, which must be attributed to input usage reductions.
Thus, relative to 1991 levels, by 2005, average quality adjusted productivity had
increased by 49.3% and exceeded that of benchmark firm, which had improved by
21.2%, therefore indicating productivity catch-up of 23.2%. Moreover, the
considerable increase in average profitability relative to the benchmark firm must be
attributed to this catch up effect. Nevertheless, after 2005, when the relatively looser
2004 price review came into effect, high levels of productivity catch-up are no longer
indicative of general productivity improvements, as average quality adjusted
productivity levels were largely static after 2005. Instead, they reflect a substantial
decline in the benchmark firm’s productivity after 2006. Thus, our results may be
30
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interpreted as suggesting that after the 2004 price review, substantial productivity
improvements were no longer occurring.

1.7
1.6
1.5
1.4
1.3
1.2
1.1
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Unit-Specific 1.0001.011 1.0461.0671.0861.1191.1561.1971.2361.2541.3701.4011.4241.4421.4931.5161.5011.517
Catch-Up

1.0001.006 1.0000.9961.0071.0131.0631.0411.0611.0881.1791.1951.2081.2021.2321.1991.1991.233

Best

1.0001.005 1.0461.0711.0791.1041.0881.1501.1641.1531.1621.1721.1791.1991.2111.2651.2521.230

Figure 5 Decomposition of Average Unit-Specific Quality Adjusted TFP Change into Benchmark
TFP Change and Average Catch-Up to the Benchmark Firm

The decomposition of quality adjusted average unit-specific TPP growth into
the quality adjusted TPP growth of the benchmark firm and average quality adjusted
TPP catch-up to the benchmark firm over time is depicted in Figure 6. Until 1994,
quality adjusted average TPP growth exceeded benchmark TPP growth allowing an
average catch-up in price performance of 3.6%. The tightened 1994 price review
resulted in a substantial downward trend in quality adjusted average and benchmark
TPP during the years 1996-1998, which was interrupted in 1999. We note that after
1995 and until the end of the period of study, quality adjusted benchmark TPP always
exceeded quality adjusted average TPP. Moreover between 1995 and 2000 there was
also a steady erosion of average price performance relative to benchmark price
performance, as reflected in the catch up index from 0.990 to 0.942. This suggests a
considerable rebalancing of regulatory price decisions in favour of the benchmark
firm, which was even more dramatically extended with the implementation of the
1999 price review in 2001. Thus, despite a massive reduction in benchmark price
performance from 1.123 to 0.889 of 1991 levels between 2000 and 2001, average
price performance fell even further, as the decline of average quality adjusted TPP
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from 1.058 to 0.780 resulted in the catch up index falling from 0.942 to 0.878. It is
therefore appropriate to interpret these results as substantial positive evidence
demonstrating that both the 1994 and 1999 price reviews resulted in considerable
movement to a regulatory price cap system consistent with a yardstick regulation
regime. We would moreover offer the suggestion, that this better alignment of
regulated prices with the principles of yardstick regulation is likely to have
contributed significantly to both the catch-up in quality adjusted productivity
illustrated in Figure 5.
Further, considering the post 2001 period, reveals a steady downward trend in
quality adjusted average and benchmark TPP except for the years 2002 and 2006.
This overall finding supports a steady deterioration in price performance, which
suggests that in practice, price caps have become even tighter since 2001. While , the
catch up index reached a low of 0.843 in 2003 and has moderately increased to 0.877
in 2008, its trend in the post 2001 period largely suggests that the relatively superior
price performance of the benchmark firm was maintained in the 2004 price review.
Our results therefore suggest that when quality is taken into account in TPP measures,
the broad convergence after 2000 between average and benchmark firm price
performance which was observed in the quality unadjusted TPP results in Figure 6.6
is no longer present. Stated differently, when quality is taken into account, an average
firm saw its price performance decline relative to the benchmark by 12.3% between
1991 and 2008 as benchmark quality adjusted benchmark TPP declined by only
20.4% while average TPP showed a higher reduction of 31.2%.
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1.7
1.6
1.5
1.4
1.3
1.2
1.1
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Unit-Specific 1.0001.0901.1341.1561.1091.0451.0521.0081.0071.0580.7800.8210.7600.7290.7060.7500.7090.698
Catch-Up

1.0001.0561.0281.0360.9900.9580.9360.9670.9810.9420.8780.8580.8430.8440.8520.8510.8520.877

Best

1.0001.0321.1031.1161.1211.0911.1241.0431.0271.1230.8890.9560.9020.8630.8280.8820.8320.796

Figure 6 Decomposition of Average Unit-Specific Quality Adjusted TPP Change into Benchmark
TPP Change and Average Catch-Up to the Benchmark Firm

Finally, Figure 7 shows the decomposition of average unit-specific quality
change into average quality catch-up relative to the benchmark firm and the quality
change of the benchmark firm, as illustrated in the third line of equation (8’). Until
1997, there were small or no gains in average quality relative to benchmark quality
but after 1998 and most of the period of study average quality growth significantly
exceeded benchmark quality growth, with particularly high levels of quality catch-up
during between 1998 and 2002. By 2005, average quality improved by 23.5% while
benchmark quality increased by 4.1% allowing average quality to catch-up to the
benchmark by 18.6%. After 2005, average quality continue to increase at a lower rate,
however, it showed a significant decline in 2007 and in 2008 which affected the
quality adjusted TFP growth rates, whereas benchmark quality followed a stable slow
upward trend. We need to emphasize that the small quality growth of the benchmark
firm did not imply that the benchmark did not achieve significant quality levels. In
contrast, our results suggest that at privatization the quality standards of the
benchmark firm had already been at a high level and by 2005 on average the less
productive firms had significantly improved their quality relative to the benchmark
and had finally reached the higher levels of quality of the benchmark firm. Given the
considerable cost of these quality improvements, figure 7 illustrates the importance of
controlling for quality changes if we wish to properly gauge relative productivity,
price, profitability, and catch up performance.
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1.5
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1.3
1.2
1.1
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Unit-Specific 1.000 1.006 1.025 1.037 1.045 1.044 1.051 1.063 1.084 1.120 1.191 1.220 1.231 1.234 1.235 1.243 1.236 1.234
Catch-Up

1.000 1.011 1.003 1.005 1.012 1.004 1.017 1.026 1.047 1.076 1.143 1.167 1.177 1.178 1.186 1.190 1.178 1.177

Best

1.000 0.995 1.021 1.031 1.033 1.040 1.039 1.043 1.042 1.046 1.042 1.045 1.045 1.048 1.041 1.044 1.049 1.048

Figure 7 Decomposition of Average Unit-Specific Quality Change into Average Quality Change
Catch-Up and Benchmark Quality Change

6. Summary and Conclusions
This paper analyzed the impact of regulation on the financial performance of
WaSCs in England and Wales over the period 1991-2008. We linked together the
spatial and temporal indices in order to derive estimates of relative productivity, price
performance and profitability measures over time. Since substantial improvements in
quality have affected the productivity and price performance of the water industry,
unit-specific profitability change was also expressed as a function of the unit-specific
quality adjusted productivity and quality-adjusted price performance change. This was
further decomposed as a function of the quality adjusted catch-up in productivity, and
the quality adjusted productivity growth of the benchmark firm, and the quality
adjusted catch-up in price performance, and the quality adjusted price performance
growth of the benchmark firm. The inclusion of quality in our analysis allowed us to
eventually decompose unit-specific economic profitability change as a function of the
quality unadjusted catch-up in productivity, the catch-up in quality, and the qualityunadjusted productivity and quality performance over time of the benchmark firm,
and the quality unadjusted catch-up in price performance, the catch-up in quality
regarding price performance, and the price performance and quality growth of the
benchmark firm, in a binary and multilateral context.
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The results indicated that while quality improvements have contributed to the
productivity performance of the WaSCs, they have also contributed negatively to their
price performance. The quality adjusted TFP results indicated that although average
productivity slightly exceeded benchmark productivity until 1995, the rate of quality
adjusted productivity growth for the average and benchmark firms was significantly
greater than the quality unadjusted TFP indicating that quality improvements did lead
to higher productivity growths. After 1997 and until 2002, average quality adjusted
TFP increased more rapidly than benchmark quality adjusted TFP, therefore allowing
average company to catch-up to benchmark quality adjusted productivity. Even after
2002 the average company achieved still significant levels of catch-up in quality
adjusted productivity until 2005, which must be attributed to input usage reductions.
Nevertheless, after 2005, when the relatively looser 2004 price review came into
effect, high levels of productivity catch-up were no longer indicative of general
productivity improvements, as average quality adjusted productivity levels were
largely static after 2005. Instead, they reflected a substantial decline in the benchmark
firm’s productivity after 2006. Thus, our results may be interpreted as suggesting that
after the 2004 price review, substantial productivity improvements were no longer
occurring.
Furthermore, focusing on the results for the average and benchmark quality
growth, it is concluded that until 1997 there were small gains in average quality
relative to benchmark quality but after 1998 average quality substantially exceeded
benchmark quality showing high levels of catch-up during the years 2000-2005. By
2005 the less productive firms on average improved significantly their quality relative
to the benchmark which already had high levels of quality since privatization.
Moreover, the quality adjusted TPP results suggested that until 1994, average
TPP exceeded benchmark TPP but after 1998, there was a steady erosion of average
price performance relative to benchmark price performance suggesting that there was
a considerable rebalancing of regulatory price decisions in favour of the benchmark
firm, which was even more dramatically extended with the implementation of the
1999 price review in 2001. The dramatic fall in both average and benchmark quality
adjusted TPP suggested that that both the 1994 and 1999 price reviews resulted in
considerable movement to a regulatory price cap system consistent with a yardstick
regulation regime. We would moreover offer the suggestion that this better alignment
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of regulated prices with the principles of yardstick regulation is likely to have
contributed significantly to both the catch-up in quality adjusted productivity and the
catch up in economic profitability. Further, considering the post 2001 period revealed
a steady downward trend in quality adjusted average and benchmark TPP except for
the years 2002 and 2006. This overall finding supported a steady deterioration in price
performance, which suggested that in practice, price caps have become even tighter
since 2001. Also after 2001 average quality adjusted TPP fell more than benchmark
quality adjusted TPP suggesting that the broad convergence after 2000 between
average and benchmark firm price performance which was observed in the quality
unadjusted TPP results was no longer present.
Overall, our index number based approach provided a backward-looking
approach regarding the impact of price cap regulation on the profitability, productivity
and price performance of less productive and benchmark firms even if the number of
available observations was extremely limited. We strongly believe that our
methodology can be of great aid for regulators in setting X-factors under price cap
regulation for regulated firms (forward-looking). Since X-factor requires the
measurement of efficiency change (catch-up) and frontier shift (technical change), our
approach provides evidence for catch-up (efficiency) in productivity by less
productive firms based on the consistent spatial productivity measures across
companies at any given year and also provides evidence for the productivity growth
of the benchmark firm (technical change).
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